ONCALL
...Family Law
......Procedure Before Trial/Hearing
 36 Cards On This Topic:
  • Approving a settlement agreement as to form and content does not make an attorney a party to it.
  • Under Sanchez, an expert witness may not relate as true the case-specific content of documents which were neither admitted into evidence nor shown to be covered by a hearsay exception.
  • Under Sanchez, psychiatric expert could testify to case-specific facts in psychiatric patient's records that were ruled admissible under the business records exception of the hearsay rule.
  • The divorce proviso exception to the litigation privilege operated to render wife's statements in dissolution proceeding unprotected; wife's anti-SLAPP motion denied.
  • A party who qualifies for a fee waiver is entitled to a waiver of the fee for a court reporter, upon request.
  • Oral testimony not required where no request is made and both sides submit the matter on the pleadings.
  • The trial ct. properly denied oral testimony where no material facts were in controversy and there was no need to assess the parties’ credibility.
  • Where law firm was vicariously disqualified from case based on a new hire in a geographically distant office who then left during the pendency of the disqualification appeal, disqualification reversed and remanded.
  • Sanchez precluded expert from relating case-specific hearsay facts about V's mental condition and aggressive behavior in hypothetical form.
  • Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion when it denies a request for continuance of a trial due to the absence of a properly called and subpoenaed witness.
  • Expert’s testimony that he relied on a database to determine the contents of the pills found on defendant’s person was not case-specific hearsay.
  • An email to the court in which opposing counsel is copied is not a prohibited ex parte communication.
  • Confrontation clause and Sanchez arguments forfeited because trial counsel failed to make a specific objection and change in law made by Sanchez was foreseeable.
  • Defendant did not forfeit Sanchez arguments on appeal by failing to raise objections at trial before Sanchez was decided.
  • Under Sanchez, expert could relate case-specific hearsay to the jury so long as it was subject to an exception; any error in relating inadmissible hearsay was harmless.
  • Trial ct. should not have considered W’s I&E without H’s having the right to cross-examine her. Absent that declaration, the record contained no evidence from which W’s need could be determined and s/s should have been terminated.
  • The trial ct. may rule on a pending vexatious litigant motion in a case even after the alleged vexatious litigant voluntarily dismisses the case.
  • When an attorney represents one side in a litigation and then switches sides, automatic disqualification of the attorney's new law firm is a presumption subject to rebuttal.
  • There is no statute of limitations under FC §1101(a) if the action is pursued following a spouse’s death; the only limitation is laches.
  • Under CCP §664.6, a court may retain jurisdiction over a matter to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement if the parties so stipulate during pending litigation, and specifically ask the court to do so.
  • Privately retained court reporters pro tempore, like official court reporters, are employees of the superior court and are subject to statutory limits for purposes of service fees they can permissibly charge.
  • In professional negligence case, relation back doctrine cannot cure plaintiff's failure to include a certificate of merit with his initial complaint.
  • A party that invites a trial ct. to commit an error cannot later challenge that error on appeal.
  • Appeal of order disqualifying attorney automatically stays enforcement of order; whether other parts of a proceeding are stayed depends on particular facts of case.
  • Sanchez does not change Evid. Code §801 (b): An expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion, and may tell the jury in general terms that he did so.
  • There is no separate "family court" per se; they are courts of general jurisdiction hearing matters arising under the Family Code.
  • Administrative proceedings do not qualify as litigation under the vexatious litigant statutes.
  • Court as gatekeeper should have precluded default judgment where, among other deficiencies, plaintiff had no standing and complaint did not state a claim.
  • Self-represented Mother not entitled to disregard rules requiring timely response to F's requests for admissions.
  • Postjudgment attorney fee requests are dealt with as motions, not trials, and may properly be heard on declarations.
  • The State Fund rule for dealing with inadvertently disclosed privileged documents applies even when an attorney receives the documents from the attorney’s client.
  • It was not enough for H merely to be present at and to participate in the temporary hearing for the "tantamount stipulation" doctrine to apply.
  • In an action tried by jury, the CCP §583.310 five-year statute of limitations is tolled when the prospective jurors are impaneled and sworn.
  • Private judge in disso disqualified for failing to disclose in writing or on the record that she had professional relationships with parties' lawyers, and failing to contest the claims.
  • Failure of private judge to respond to challenge as required by CCP §170.3(c)(3), admitted the validity of the allegations.
  • Disqualification of a judge is sought in the form of a “statement of disqualification,” which is not a motion.


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