ONCALL
...Evidence
......Court Control of Proceedings
40 Cards On This Topic:

Trial ct. did not err when it instructed the jury that D could be convicted of resisting, obstructing or delaying a police officer if the jury found he stepped in front of an officer as he was writing a citation.

Chiu was not violated where jury instruction stated each defendant must be found to have acted with premeditation and deliberation in order to be convicted of first degree murder.

Trial ct. did not err in not instructing the jury sua sponte on defense of duress where there was insufficient evidence that defendant's belief his life was threatened was reasonable; any error was harmless.

Trial ct. did not err in refusing to give a voluntary intoxication instruction for a general intent crime against property.

Trial ct. committed no error in its jury instructions in disability harassment case.

Trial ct. did not err in failing to require unanimity from the jury on the theory of first-degree murder under which it convicted defendant.

Jury instructions did not undermine and dilute the jury's duty to determine defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, nor did instructions shift the prosecution's burden of proof onto defendant.

Trial ct. did not err in failing to give a sua sponte instruction on lesser conspiracy offenses where the prosecution's accusatory pleading contained no overt acts supporting these offenses.

Failure to instruct on murder with malice aforethought, lesser included offenses and applicable defenses was harmless error where the jury resolved the relevant factual disputes through its felony-murder special circumstance finding.

Confrontation clause and Sanchez arguments forfeited because trial counsel failed to make a specific objection and change in law made by Sanchez was foreseeable.

Defendant did not forfeit Sanchez arguments on appeal by failing to raise objections at trial before Sanchez was decided.

Even though defendant's case was tried before Sanchez was decided, failure of D's counsel to make a hearsay objection constituted forfeiture where pre-Sanchez cases indicated that an expert's testimony to hearsay was objectionable.

Trial ct.'s denial of defendant's request to wear his wedding ring in the courtroom did not violate his state and federal constitutional right to be tried in civilian attire.

MDO commitment reversed and remanded for new trial where jury instruction invited jury to consider that defendant could be released into the community unsupervised.

Reversal of conviction required when the trial court instructed the jury on two theories of guilt, one legally correct and one legally incorrect, and there was no basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on the legally correct theory.

While trial ct. could question witness, it caused a mistrial when it became an advocate for plaintiff, acted as cross-examiner, and was hostile to the witness.

Trial ct. not required to give jury instruction on lesser included offense where a reasonable jury could not conclude that there were facts to support it.

Where jury convicts D of lesser related offenses and deadlocks on greater offense, on retrial defense may request instruction that acquittal on greater offense will not necessarily result in D escaping all criminal liability.

Where jury convicts D of lesser related offenses and deadlocks on greater offense, on retrial the court errs if it informs the new jury of the fact of such specific convictions.

Court prejudicially erred when it failed to instruct jury on lesser included offense when there was substantial evidence the lesser crime was committed.

CALCRIM No. 1520, the jury instruction for attempted arson, correctly instructs on specific intent.

CALJIC No. 2.50.02, permitting jurors to draw an inference of a defendant’s disposition to commit domestic violence based on proof of a charged crime by a preponderance of the evidence, is not unconstitutional.

Even though Sanchez was decided after defendant's trial, his attorney's failure to object to case-specific hearsay admitted as the basis of expert's opinion waived argument for appeal.

When D is on trial for sex offenses that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, possible error to instruct jury that it may consider D's uncharged sex offenses if they are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Conviction reversed where jury instruction did not define an essential element of the crime, "without lawful necessity," and court erroneously told jurors this definition was in a second instruction.

Conviction reversed for failure to instruct jury that defendant's mere presence at crime scene was not enough to convict him of aiding and abetting assault.

Under Sanchez, the prosecution violated defendants' Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by introducing testimonial hearsay through a gang expert.

Convictions for dissuading witnesses reversed where trial ct. failed to instruct jury as to an element of the offense.

In custody deprivation case, error to instruct jury on elements of affirmative defense over defendant's counsel's objection where instruction contradicted defense theory; error harmless.

In child custody deprivation case, court erred in not giving specific intent jury instruction where crime requires malice; error harmless given overwhelming evidence of malice.

Conviction reversed where jury instructions for transportation for sale omitted an essential element of the offense, and the evidence supporting the missing element was not overwhelming.

Trial ct. must advise the petitioner in mentally disordered offender proceedings of the right to jury trial and elicit a waiver before a bench trial unless petitioner lacks capacity.

When the DA elects to proceed on one factual theory, and that election obviates the need for a unanimity instruction, appellate court is bound by the DA’s election.

No manifest abuse of discretion in court requiring criminal D to wear restraints while representing himself at trial where D had history of violence and court used least intrusive means of maintaining court safety.

Exclusion of D's family from the courtroom during his trial violated D's constitutional right to a public trial where there was a lack of substantial evidence of a connection between D's family and witness intimidation.

A PC §1608 hearing regarding revocation of outpatient status for a mentally disordered offender does not require the offender's presence.

Failure to advise D that the jury would be comprised of 12 jurors who must unanimously find his guilt does not render the waiver of jury trial inadequate.

Condition imposing warrantless search of M's media reasonably likely to concern boasting about drug use and drug is proper, but overbroad in requiring he provide passwords to other digital accounts.

No error in not providing a court reporter as P had proper notice that each had to provide his own; regardless of P's fee waiver, court need not provide indigent litigants with such services where no official reporter is provided by the court.

Partial Acquittal Rule continues to apply in criminal prosecutions in CA state courts until the CA Supreme Court holds otherwise.