CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
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Court Control of Proceedings
......Shackling, Other Security
20 Cards On This Topic:
Even if the trial court said use of the stun belt was "appropriate," rather than "necessary," court did not use a lower standard as the record as a whole established the manifest need standard was met.
No abuse of discretion in ruling the use of a stun belt was appropriate where court addressed D's fear the device would be accidentally activated, a risk identified later in Mar.
No abuse of discretion in using physical restraints during D's transit through the public hallways of the San Bernardino courthouse without any particularized showing of need.
Trial ct. acted within its discretion in ordering Ds to wear either shackles or stun belts where record reflected a manifest need to physically restrain Ds.
No abuse of discretion in ordering D be restrained with a REACT electronic stun belt at trial where D posed a safety risk based on violent incidents in jail and his studying the bailiffs' guns—finding of manifest need adequately supported.
Harmless error under CA law for two judges to require D to wear REACT stun belt in courtroom during both guilt and penalty phases.
Although issue waived, there would have been no error in D's having to wear an electric shock belt during trial where jurors did not see it.
Absent any indication that the jury was aware of D's physical restraints, or a request from D for an instruction, trial court did not err by failing to instruct with CALJIC No. 1.04.
Placing uniformed, armed bailiff behind D while he testified was harmless error under Watson; court should have determined on a case-specific decision whether such heightened security was appropriate.
Any error in compelling D to wear a stun belt at hearing and failing to make manifest need finding was not prejudicial where D did not claim stun belt affected him or his demeanor while testifying.
Error, if any, in using leg restraints on D at trial was harmless where no evidence any juror observed the restraints.
No error for Ds to wear leg brace restraint for a day during voir dire where jurors couldn't see the brace, and it was not unduly restrictive; even if error for court to "defer" to deputies in permitting the brace's use, error harmless.
No abuse of discretion in ordering D to wear REACT electronic security belt during trial where court expressly made a record of facts re D's violence and D could have chosen traditional alternative restraints.
Stationing courtroom deputy next to testifying D is not an inherently prejudicial practice that must be justified by a showing of manifest need—it is not akin to "human shackling."
Harmless error to shackle D during voir dire without showing of manifest necessity where shackles not visible to jury.
No error in not ordering D's leg restraints removed where he was sitting at counsel table and the restraints could not be seen.
Trial court properly exercised its discretion in securing the courtroom by placing deputy next to disruptive D during testimony—shackling distinguished.
Assuming under Hernandez that D's rights violated by deputy accompanying him to and from the stand and standing/sitting behind him as he testified, error harmless under Watson standard.
Prejudicial error to shackle D's legs at trial over objection where no showing of manifest need made and jury saw the unjustified shackling.
Handcuffed D was entitled to Miranda warnings before questioning—as DA used D’s custodial statements to impeach him, he was entitled to CALJIC No. 2.13.1 instruction to consider statements only re credibility.