CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Court Control of Proceedings
......Jury Instructions
.........Duty to Instruct Jury
40 Cards On This Topic:

No sua sponte duty to instruct on simple assault where evidence showed 14-mo.-old died of multiple blunt force blows and massive internal trauma after F jumped on him during "play wrestling."

No duty to instruct on accomplice testimony where no evidence witness intended to aid, facilitate, or encourage D’s actions, or that he even knew D intended to shoot people at his old school.

No error in refusing to amend cautionary instruction re in-custody informants to include in-custody percipient Ws where Legislature's deliberate distinction b/t the two would be erased by such amendment.

Trial court adequately admonished jurors per then-existing PC 1122—admonition to refrain from reading, viewing, or listening to media coverage, though permissible, not required by section 1122.

Trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct that the jury could not find a forcible rape if V merely was passive and D did not know and had no reason to know she did not consent.

CALJIC No. 8.85 is correct and adequate, and no error in court's refusal to provide a more specific instruction informing jury that it may consider D's lack of prior felony convictions to be a factor in mitigation.

Trial court has a duty to instruct on its own motion on a particular defense only if it appears D is relying on the defense, or substantial evidence supports it and it is consistent with D's theory of the case.

Consciousness of guilt instructions do not call for impermissible inferences about mental state, nor are they otherwise inappropriate.

Any error in omitting additional cautionary admonition, that D's out-of-court oral admission be viewed with caution, was harmless under any standard.

Trial court not constitutionally required to instruct the jury that age is relevant only to mitigation; court did instruct that age could not be considered as an aggravating factor.

Trial court did not err in sua sponte giving cautionary instructions as to no special weight re former DA's testimony where his prosecution ended 12 years before, he was said to be retired, and testified only as percipient witness.

Where charging document charges in language of statute defining murder, the offense charged includes murder in 1st and 2d degree—trial court correctly instructed on felony murder and jury correct in returning verdict of 1st degree.

Instructions to jury on elements of unadjudicated crimes are not required by logic or by constitutional guarantees of due process, fundamental fairness, right to a fair trial, equal protection, or reliability of penalty.

Court not required to instruct sua sponte on 2d degree murder where evidence did not support it.

Trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct that possession of recently stolen property was insufficient by itself to establish guilt of charged offenses.

Trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on assault as lesser included offense of robbery.

No error in failing to instruct sua sponte on theft and definition of "steal" where D did not ask for clarification and "steal" is, in common every-day use and general acceptation, as well understood as any word in English.

Juries need not be instructed to view with caution admissions made as part of plea bargain stemming from uncharged conduct; in any case, no prejudice as D never disputed signing plea bargain stmt.

In light of all trial court instructions and counsel's explicit arguments on similarity of charged and uncharged conduct, no error in omitting portion of oral instruction which was included in written instruction.

A trial court has no obligation to omit inapplicable factors from a jury instruction.

Trial court had no duty to give CALJIC 2.10 limiting instruction where psychiatrist testified for the ••defense•• at the ••penalty•• phase not at guilt phase after D placed mental condition in issue.

Reversible error not to instruct an aider and abettor can't be convicted of 1st degree ••premeditated•• murder per natural and probable consequences doctrine, and that liability must be based on direct aiding and abetting principles.

Based on V's testimony, trial court had duty to instruct on lesser included offense of nonforcible oral copulation with a minor as to forcible oral copulation of minor over 14 and forcible oral copulation in concert of minor over 14.

Error to refuse to give manslaughter instructions based on heat of passion / provocation where evidence raised factual question whether D was provoked by V’s repeated threats to take her son away from her when she shot him.

Trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that felony-murder liability does not attach to a D who aids and abets the perpetrator only after the killing; error in not so instructing was prejudicial.

Trial court had no duty to instruct on "mistake of fact" sua sponte as it is not a true affirmative defense, but only negates the mental state element of the crime.

Ordering Ps' attorney to remove two pages from her website discussing similar cases was an unlawful prior restraint on her free speech rights; admonitions and instructions presumptively adequate to address threat of jury contamination.

Constitutional error not to instruct on the potential effect of provocation to negate malice aforethought—as no instruction jury could consider provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter, Chapman test applied.

No error in giving CALCRIM No. 505, 571 and 604, which properly state the law re imminent peril; special instruction did not foreclose application of imperfect self-defense and reasonable jury would so understand.

As there is no requirement that the trial ct. give an uncharged lesser related offense instruction even if D and DA agree to it, court's refusal to give the instruction here was not error.

Re kidnapping for ransom, trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on DA's burden to prove V did not consent to being confined and that D did not actually and reasonably believe V consented.

Trial court did not err by not instructing on the definition of "intoxicating agent" where term has a common meaning based on its ordinary use and does not require further definition by the court.

Failure to instruct on legal definition of "likely" re child endangerment not prejudicial to D where factual question posed by the omitted definition was resolved adversely to him in other, properly given, instruction.

Trial court correctly instructed with CALCRIM 224 rather than narrower CALCRIM 225 even though DA's case built on exceptionally strong circumstantial evidence; error, if any, was harmless.

As there was sufficient evidence of self-defense, and D requested the instruction, trial court was required to give it, along with lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter by means of imperfect self-defense.

No error in not instructing re involuntary manslaughter stemming from voluntary intoxication where evidence showed D's alcohol consumption led to level of intoxication short of "grossly intoxicated" state of unconsciousness.

No error in failing to give D's proposed amplifying instruction concerning meaning of "care or custody" as it relates to endangerment .

Trial court had no duty to instruct on mistake of law or mistake of fact where D "did not think he did anything wrong." This not a cognizable legal defense to D's crimes and he didn't rely on such below.

Supervening causation instructions must be given sua sponte only if called for under facts of case.

No sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter [provocation/heat of passion] or imperfect self-defense where no evidence D was physically injured, or in imminent danger of GBI or death by V or other deputies.