CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Hearsay Exceptions re Statements
......Co-Defendant (Crim.) Admissions
.........In General: Aranda Rule of Exclusion
34 Cards On This Topic:

In classic case for a joint trial, where Ds charged with same crimes arising from same events, no error in refusing to grant Ds' severance request.

No Bruton violation as no admission of stmt by co-D inculpating D—W's testimony, incl. D's accusations that "Mike (co-D)" must have told her D killed V, did not pose a substantial threat to D's right to confront Ws against him.

No abuse of discretion in denying Ds' severance motions where there was sufficient independent evidence of guilt apart from any potential conflict in the defenses, and in any case, the defenses were not truly antagonistic.

D's conversation with W not testimonial as it did not involve a police agent, and no Aranda/Bruton error where D's stmts not powerfully incriminating re co-D, but only vague stmts about unnamed persons in event that had not occurred.

Severance motions properly denied in murder-for-hire case where D and co-Ds charged with committing common crimes involving common events and victims, a classic case for a joint trial.

Admission of D's confession implicating co-D may be improper as prejudicial to nondeclarant co-D, even with instruction that confession only be considered against D.

Trial court procedures for introduction of D's extrajudicial statement which implicates co-D.

Admission of co-D's confession inculpating D violates D's right of confrontation where co-D does not testify, despite limiting instruction.

Admission of nontestifying brother's untested confession violated D's Confrontation Clause rights.

Confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible against co-D's if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor.

Presumption that co-D's confession unreliable not overcome by confessions that overlap in some factual recitations, if discrepancies go to very issues in dispute at trial.

Nontestifying co-D's confession incriminating D not admissible at joint trial, even if jury instructed not to consider it against D and D's own confession is admitted.

Co-D's extrajudicial statement implicating D does not violate D's right of confrontation where co-D testifies, denies making statement and asserts statement false.

Habeas relief properly denied where admission of fact of coparticipant’s stmt to officer was not confrontation violation and stmt did not even mention D.

No Bruton error where incriminating, unanswered question posed by co-D's counsel was neither part of AG's case nor in evidence & limiting instruction sufficient.

No abuse of discretion in denying D’s motion to sever trial from co-D brother's in "classic" case for joint trial; antagonistic defenses do not ••per se•• require severance, even if Ds are hostile or attempt to cast the blame on each other.

No abuse of discretion in denying Ds' severance motions where their cases were not so conflicting as to require a severance, and conflict between the potential defenses ••alone•• was not likely to lead jury to guilty verdicts.

No abuse of discretion in denying D's motion for severance in "'classic case'" for joint trial.

Antagonistic defenses do not warrant severance unless acceptance of one party's defense would preclude acquittal of the other—D's defense and those of coDs not so irreconcilable that only one could be guilty.

Although coD's stmts at joint trial testimonial, jury instructed to consider coD1's statements against her alone, not "against" D; redacted coD stmts that satisfy Bruton are not admitted "against" D under Crawford.

Co-D's extrajudicial statement implicating another D, admitted via informant, need not be excluded when co-D testifies and is available for cross-examination; no Aranda-Bruton error.

Admission at joint trial of previously excluded calls between Ds was not DP violation where D1 cross-examined D2—their admission did not violate Aranda-Bruton and when admitted for impeachment, D1 agreed to limiting instructions.

To extent there was Aranda/Bruton error, exclusion of D1's out-of-court statement that he and D2 went looking for V would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome at trial for D2.

Reversal of freeway shooting convictions required where D's redacted statements effectively rendered his exculpatory account of shooting implausible and were admitted in violation of Aranda/Bruton and EC 356.

Admitting co-Ds' statements, error under Crawford and Aranda-Bruton, was not harmless as to D's kidnapping charge where statements not merely cumulative but strongly corroborated V's testimony on key point.

Co-D’s hearsay statements in joint interrogation that implicated D in abuse of V were not adoptive admissions and so improperly admitted in violation of Aranda and Bruton.

Reversible error to admit O's hearsay testimony re accomplice's redacted postarrest stmts implicating D where statements not disserving to declarant's interests & lacked sufficient indicia of trustworthiness under Evid. Code §1230.

Admitting out-of-court statements nontestifying co-D made to friend did not violate confrontation clause where they met residual trustworthiness test.

Admission of extrajudicial statements of coparticipants, per Evid. Code §1230, did not deny D's rights under confrontation clause.

Declaration against interest may be admitted in joint trial so long as statement satisfies statutory definition and otherwise satisfies constitutional requirement of trustworthiness.

Necessary corroborative evidence for accomplice testimony can be D's own admissions.

D2's sanitized, extrajudicial reference to "friends" at scene of crime did not implicate D1 and not subject to Aranda exclusion.

Co-D's extrajudicial statement must explicitly mention D to constitute error under Bruton/Aranda doctrine.

Where co-D testifies and is available for cross-examination, admission of co-D's extrajudicial statement implicating D does not violate D's right of confrontation.