PRETRIAL ADJUDICATION
...Motion to Strike
......Special Motion to Strike
.........SLAPP Statute Inapplicable
24 Cards On This Topic:
  • Where former atty became involved in a campaign to thwart former client's RE project, client's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and breach of K had at least minimal merit per anti-SLAPP statute.
  • Property dispute between local and general church not subject to anti-SLAPP motion where actual dispute concerned property ownership rather than protected activity.
  • CSC's former decision affirming Court of Appeal's holding church property dispute was not a SLAPP suit did not mean the actions were finally decided—remand required to address remaining issues.
  • Denial of Ps' CCP 425.16 mtn. re breach of K claim proper where it did not arise from protected activity; mtn. properly granted as to breach of implied covenant of GF and FD where based on protected petitioning activity.
  • Because W's act of making a false police report against H was not in furtherance of her constitutional rights of petition or free speech, anti-SLAPP statute does not protect her against H's civil suit.
  • P's wiretapping and privacy invasion allegations did not "arise from" any protected activity by D on behalf of P where P was a stranger to the litigation between his wiretapped next-door neighbor and her ex-boyfriend.
  • Anti-SLAPP motion properly denied where complaint did not arise from protected activity, but from a business dispute between the parties, and mention of any protected activity was merely incidental.
  • Student's web site message threatening another student b/c of his perceived sexual orientation was not protected by CCP 425.16 where lawsuit did not arise out of a statement made in connection with a “public issue.”
  • Not every mundane communication between HOA and homeowner gives rise to freedom of speech issue; CCP 425.16 (e)(4) does not come into play unless the right of free speech or the right to petition is involved.
  • Where negotiation of settlement agreement in prior case is an act in furtherance of right to petition, D atty's anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted.
  • Filing a lawsuit in a foreign country is not protected activity under U.S. or CA Constitutions so as to implicate anti-SLAPP statute.
  • Special motion to strike reversed where tenant's unlawful eviction claim did not arise from protected free speech activity, but was based on D landlord's violation of rent control laws.
  • Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply where protected activity is only incidental to atty conflict of interest C/A.
  • CCP 425.16 does not protect act of initiating private, K arbitration—statute protects statements made in, or re issues under review by, a judicial or other official proceeding—private, K arbitration is neither.
  • D atty's anti-SLAPP motion invalid where he threatened to file State Bar complaint against P if P didn't sign settlement, an act of extortion.
  • Where evidence at CCP 425.16 motion enables P to show probability of prevailing on defamation claim, policy concerns against amendment in this context do not apply because P's suit, likely meritorious, is not a SLAPP suit.
  • As even the broadest interpretation of the plain language of CCP 425.16 cannot stretch it to cover request for a subpoena, superior court erred in granting Does’ 425.16 motion and in awarding attorney’s fees.
  • Trial court correctly found that nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, including the notice of foreclosure, were not constitutionally protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.
  • Terminating a tenancy or removing a property from the rental market are not activities taken in furtherance of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech for CCP 425.16 purposes.
  • SLAPP statute does not apply where it is the prayer for an injunction, not a cause of action, which arises from an act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech.
  • City's action seeking declaration that Ds' proposed initiative was invalid as not a proper subject for local initiative, was not directed at protected conduct and Ds' CCP 425.16 motion should not have been granted.
  • CCP 425.16 does not apply to Ps' C/As against attorney for breach of K, professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.
  • Error to grant special mtn to strike where C/As based on allegations about manner in which private RE transactions conducted, and governmental permit app's were only incidental to principal purposes of the transactions.
  • Trial court properly denied Ds' CCP 425.16 motion where complaint arose from "fact" of law firm's dual representation of Ps and adversary and not from any protected litigation-related activity.