CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
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Evid. Affected by Extrinsic Policies
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Verdict: Evidence to Test
............Impchmnt of Verdict: Overt Acts/Conduct
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No juror misconduct in jury foreman's drawing on her own medical experience to form opinions during deliberations.
Jury's considering unadmitted tape of statements by Billionaire Boys Club D's non-witness brother was prejudicial error necessitating new trial.
As no juror read anything in erroneously requested dictionary, no extrinsic evidence considered and no reasonable possibility evidence affected jury's deliberations.
D failed to demonstrate that Juror's misconduct in testing driving time to scene of murder was material or prejudicial to question of guilt.
Even if discussions regarding urine in the stairwell clearly took place in the presence of a bailiff escorting jurors, they did not necessarily constitute improper communication by the bailiff or misconduct by the jurors.
Death verdict reversed due to substantial likelihood juror was biased against D by his improper conversation with his pastor during deliberations, and his DP vote was not based solely on evidence and instructions.
Trial ct. erred in declaring jury misconduct in discussing Ds’ decisions not to testify to be prejudicial w/out considering conflicting evidence as to whether proper instructions were given.
Reversal required in DP case where overwhelming evidence established juror committed prejudicial misconduct in discussing and prejudging penalty during guilt phase.
Juror did not commit misconduct by "venting" to her H where it exposed her to no extraneous information or opinion from H.
Nature of the misconduct and surrounding circumstances did not show a prison movie watched by two jurors during trial was an important factor in convincing them to change their minds and vote for the death penalty.
Assuming D’s ••courtroom•• outbursts during jury selection was receiving information from an “outside” source, D can't complain when the prejudice he may have suffered resulted from his own voluntary act.
Guilt and DP judgments reversed where juror dismissed for misconduct did not in fact prejudge the case or rely on evidence not presented at trial.
No basis for juror misconduct ruling where juror's computer diagram and jury's deliberation room demo was a 'more critical examination' of the evidence admitted, not a new investigation going beyond the evidence admitted.
Court's inquiry of juror re conversation w/her husband rebutted presumption of prejudice arising from conversation.
Because neither presence of humorous cartoon in jury room nor bailiff's information suggested juror misconduct, trial court not required to conduct further inquiry into cartoon's possible effect on the jury.
Juror committed misconduct by looking up definitions of aggravate and mitigate, but presumption of prejudice rebutted because the outside information inherently nonprejudicial.
No inherent and substantial likelihood that extraneous information from juror who spoke with priest about death penalty influenced other jurors or resulted in any juror's actual bias in rendering penalty phase verdict.
No misconduct in denying new trial for juror's having discussed death penalty with employer where discussion took place after penalty phase deliberations.
Where, as prompted by defense counsel, defense expert expressly analyzed D's demeanor during trial, it was not misconduct for jury to discuss his demeanor during deliberations.
Biblical verses read in jury room not prejudicial misconduct where jurors understood them as a response to one juror's doubts about sitting in judgment, not to advance a religiously-based argument for death penalty for D.
Trial court correct in finding jurors' exposure to newspaper articles reporting on D's trial did not prejudice verdict-merely reading newspaper account of trial not sufficient to create substantial likelihood of prejudice.
Presumption of prejudice from juror's failing to disclose material prior history was rebutted by juror's statements, trial court's judgment of his credibility and later voluntary disclosure of information.
Juror/nurse's explanation of blood evidence was not improperly asserting her expertise but was merely her opinion based on pathologist's trial.
When trial court, after examining all relevant circs, grants criminal new trial on grounds proven misconduct prejudicial, not subject to independent or de novo review, but may be affirmed if not abuse of discretion.
Juror stating he had experience with type of drugs D said he took before murders, but they didn't have same effect on him, "simply reflected the juror's background and experiences" and did not amount to prejudicial misconduct.
Claim of juror misconduct in basing death sentence on D’s lack of emotion on stand lacked merit as jury could properly consider such in evaluating both evidence in mitigation and credibility.
Court properly refused to call juror in fishing expedition re possible misconduct where no hearing requested and no evidence presented re prej. misconduct or material conflict.
Presumption of prejudice arising from juror's misconduct not rebutted in sanity phase verdict.
Verbal expressions of jurors' thought processes excluded.
Impeachment of verdict limited to overt acts or conduct.
In deciding whether to hold a hearing on a motion for disclosure of jurors’ identifying info, the trial court must assume the declarations supporting the motion are credible; Johnson I overruled.
D did not show good cause for release of juror information where their use of toy cars to reenact the collision was not an investigation going beyond the evidence at trial nor an attempt to discover new evidence.
By violating instruction not to discuss D's failure to testify, jury committed misconduct—the mere making of such a statement in the jury room was an overt act of misconduct and admissible under EC 1150.
No error in denying D’s NT motion based on juror misconduct where D did not establish jury's timing “experiment” went beyond admitted evidence.
In investigating juror misconduct, trial ct. may order Juror to execute SCA consent form authorizing Facebook to release for in camera review all items Juror posted during trial; disclosure would not violate the Stored Communications Act.
Where jurors rely on no extrinsic evidence, or extraneous materials, or conduct improper experiment, not misconduct to reject & correct E's formulaic "miscalculation" of the anticipated yield of an indoor MJ garden.
Reversal for juror misconduct required where juror's homemade experiment produced new evidence without the knowledge of either party, and which the party injured could not answer.
New trial may not be granted w/out sworn juror affidavits showing misconduct; perilous for jury to research alternate definition of reasonable doubt in deliberations — presumption of prejudice arises.
No abuse of discretion in decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on charges of juror misconduct where the matters discussed were mere speculation and not prejudicial.
New trial for P affirmed where juror made up her mind about case in second week of trial and her various statements were circumstantial evidence of her bias against P.
Alternate juror's comments did not taint the jury where they were not inherently influential, and no suggestion they actually influenced the jury.
Trial court did not err in denying new trial motion for juror misconduct where no information brought into jury room from extraneous source and no prejudice to D.
Juror's dissuasion of another from asking for discharge as holdout juror was not prejudicial juror misconduct where juror professed no expertise in judicial practices but expressed an opinion based on life experience he had had.
Trial court did not err when it refused to remove juror for misconduct after she applauded by clapping her hands during P's rebuttal argument.
No abuse of discretion in granting new trial based on juror misconduct where juror presented specialized evidence to jury even though jurors instructed ••not to•• inject specialized knowledge into deliberations.
Trial court properly ordered new trial on ground of juror misconduct where juror intentionally concealed her knowledge and her probable bias could have affected verdict.
Trial ct. acted reasonably with good cause to dismiss juror for comments indicating she was considering penalty at guilt stage, and for not dismissing another for commenting on victims' photos during deliberations.
New trial necessitated by majority voters' extreme, concealed bias against Ds, supported by other jurors' improperly stricken decls; evident bias based on prior experience not evidence.
Jury misconduct did not preclude City from receiving fair trial in FEHA suit by employee for retaliation.
Juror's discussing new evidence in jury room from sources outside trial evidence constitutes clear and undisputed misconduct requiring new trial.
Juror's out of court experiment with non juror reenacting officers' arm hold on P, and juror's subsequent report to jury, constituted juror misconduct necessitating new trial.
Although juror committed misconduct in discussing prosecutor's marital status and "availability," resulting presumption of prejudice rebutted.
Death penalty D has right to jury questionnaires with personal juror identification information redacted.
Mere presence of dictionary in jury room does not show misconduct where jury admonished not to use one and there was no specific info re such use; presumption of prejudice did not arise.
Hutchinson rule applies to civil cases.
No error where trial court not put on notice of good cause to discharge J and claim of juror misconduct not a "demonstrable reality."
Juror's reading to jury a statement she composed over weekend from her own thoughts about evidence is not misconduct.
Court cannot evaluate correctness of jurors' reasoning.
No error in denying new trial where evidence did not show "strong possibility" juror's voir dire response untruthful.