ONCALL
...Children and the Law
......Delinquency Matters
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Prop. 57 applies to any judgment that was not final before the statute took effect.

M's 40-year-to-life sentence is not the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence and is not in violation of Miller where he will receive a meaningful opportunity for release upon his 25th year of incarceration.

Minor can be ordered to pay restitution for losses beyond those resulting from his or her charged criminal conduct as a condition of probation.

Substantial evidence supported minor's placement at the Division of Juvenile Justice where a series of less restrictive placements failed to rehabilitate him.

Minor's custody credits properly applied by the juvenile ct.

Under W&IC §208.5, a juvenile ct. may transfer to county jail an 18-yr.-old that has not yet been found unsuitable for treatment under the juvenile ct. laws.

A youth offender sentenced to 28 years to life and later found suitable for release under youth offender parole provisions is not required, prior to release, to serve a consecutive sentence for a crime committed in prison after age 25.

Probation condition that M not be present on any school campus unless enrolled in that school found overbroad; condition modified.

Probation condition that M must have peaceful contact with law enforcement found unconstitutionally vague; condition struck.

PC §3051 supersedes PC §1170.1 with regard to youth offenders who commit in-prison crimes as adults.

Minor's parents not required to reimburse county for legal services provided to minor where no determination was made that parents owed, and juvenile ct. did not order parents to pay a specified sum.

Juvenile ct. properly found M was resisting a police officer in the course of her duties where M was not under investigation or arrest, but was detained by officer for her safety.

Findings that minor committed burglary and received stolen property reversed in light of Prop. 47.

Juvenile ct. erred in finding minor unsuitable for treatment in the juvenile ct. system where its conclusions regarding two of the five statutory factors were unsupported by substantial evidence.

Juvenile offender sentenced to prison before mandatory youth offender parole hearings were enacted is entitled to remand to the trial ct. to make a record of youth-related factors relevant to his eventual parole hearing.

Warrantless electronic search condition valid even where minor's past criminal activity did not involve use of electronic devices; condition also not unconstitutional.

While protocol developed by probation dept. and child welf. dept. to determine status of minor under W&IC §241.1 had legal shortcomings, any error was harmless where juv. ct. was presented with exhaustive information regarding minor.

Minor did not violate PC §148 (resisting a peace officer) where her arresting officer was not performing a legal duty when he ordered her to go to class.

W&IC §786(e) providing for sealing of all records related to dismissed or unsustained petitions, applied to minor's case because it was not final and pending on appeal.

Prop. 57 may be applied retroactively by granting defendant a conditional reversal of his or her sentence dependent on the outcome of a juvenile transfer hearing on remand.

Minor could not benefit from the retroactivity of Prop. 57 because a final judgment is rendered when the trial ct. suspends a prison sentence during a probationary period.

The five-day limitation of W&IC §653.5 is directory and not mandatory.

Graham required remand for resentencing of 16-year-old Ds convicted of kidnapping and rape and sentenced to 50+ years to life.

Jurisdictional findings and dispositional order reversed where a reasonable 12 year old like M would believe he was not free to leave interviews with police, and police did not give Miranda warnings during questioning.

Juvenile offender sentenced to 40 years to life before Franklin granted remand to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to youth.

Prop. 57 applies retroactively to cases filed in adult court before it took effect.

Probation condition that included a total ban on depictions of nudity was unconstitutionally overbroad.

Trial ct.'s conclusion that school district's expulsion decision was supported by substantial evidence affirmed where decision was not based solely upon hearsay evidence.

Conviction for felony vehicle theft reversed where prosecution did not prove vehicle was worth more than $950.

Double jeopardy prevented remand to juvenile ct. for additional evidence as to value of stolen car where prosecution initially submitted no proof as to its value even though the law so required.

Minor must be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard before a two-year restraining order is issued against him.

Where police officer received a report from school principal that minor had a gun on campus, detention of M was not arbitrary or capricious and therefore did not constitute unreasonable search and seizure.

Search of minor on school grounds did not violate the Fourth Amendment where principal informed police that minor had a gun.

PC §245(c) sets out a single offense.

Juvenile ct. erred in granting prosecution's post-disposition motion to dismiss most recent count of W&IC §602 petition in order to make minor eligible for Div. of Juvenile Facilities commitment.

Wardship reversed where W&IC §241.1 report was not timely, did not contain required statements from minor's counsel and court appointed special advocate, and court did not provide statement of reasons.

A court may order the sealing of minor's records other than those of a law enforcement agency, probation dept. or Dept. of Justice if the court determines sealing will promote rehabilitation and reentry of minor.

Prop. 57 does not apply retroactively to a juvenile offender that was charged, tried, convicted and sentenced before the proposition's effective date, but whose case is not yet final on appeal.

PC §3051(b)(4) mooted defendant's contention that her LWOP sentence violated Miller and the Eighth Amendment.

Under W&IC §786, ward who successfully completes probation is entitled to sealing of all juvenile ct. records and all other records held by DOJ and other agencies regarding the ward's case.

Proposition 57 does not apply retroactively.

No abuse of discretion to lift deferred entry of judgment, sustain W&IC §602 petition, and not seal minor's records where he did not fulfill conditions of probation by dropping out of school.

PC §29610, prohibiting possession of a firearm by a minor, does not preempt PC §25400(a)(2), prohibiting carrying of a concealed firearm, because the statutes proscribe different conduct.

M did not violate PC §148 where there was no evidence that he knew, or reasonably should have known, the police were pursuing him.

Prop. 57 applies retroactively to juvenile offenders whose cases are not yet final on appeal.

Lifetime sex offender registration for an offense committed as a juvenile is not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

There is no statutory exception for the release of information from a sealed juvenile delinquency file to a third party criminal defendant, and courts cannot create one.

Where a robbery finding in a delinquency petition is dismissed under W&IC §781, defendant is eligible to have his records sealed under W&IC §782.

The detention of an incompetent minor for more than 120 days under a court protocol did not implicate due process concerns; assuming a due process violation, there was no prejudice to minor given his malingering.

Arbuckle impliedly guarantees that the judge who accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion will also impose sentencing.

Sealing of records under W&IC §781 requires that all minor's offenses be eligible for sealing; selective expungement is not allowed.

Juvenile ct. has discretion to find that a record of an adjudication for assault with a deadly weapon is ineligible for sealing under W&IC §707(b)(14).

W&IC §786 mandating automatic sealing of a minor's records upon completion of probation applies to a petition to seal that was filed before, but adjudicated after, the section was enacted.

Proposition 57 is not retroactive.

Minor who successfully completes an informal program of supervision after a delinquency petition has been filed against him is entitled to have his records sealed.

The suitability hearing provisions of Prop. 57 are not retroactive.

When the juvenile ct. finds that M has satisfactorily completed probation, it must dismiss the wardship petition and seal the records.

A juvenile adjudication for sexual battery is not a prior conviction disqualifying minor from Prop. 47 relief.

A truant M's participation in the School Attendance Review Board process is not a prerequisite to juvenile ct. jurisdiction; four truancy reports confer jurisdiction.

M forfeits appellate challenge of probation conditions where he did not object in juvenile ct. and conditions are not facially unconstitutional.

Where juvenile ct. failed to award M custody credits and number of credits is undisputed, remand unnecessary to modify juvenile ct.'s order as to M's credits.

Under CRC 5.651(b)(2)(D), juvenile ct. need only address M's educational needs in imposing education probation condition; rule does not specify information that must be considered.

Constitutional vagueness of search condition referring to "property" may be addressed without examining the juvenile ct. record and therefore may be challenged for the first time on appeal; condition not vague.

Overbreadth challenge to search condition requires examination of the juvenile ct. record and therefore appellate challenge is forfeited if not raised at juvenile ct.

M's probation condition stating "nor shall he participate in any gang-related activity" is not unconstitutionally vague as it cannot be reasonably understood to apply to lawful activities.

PC §1170 (d)(2) resentencing does not provide an adequate remedy for a juvenile offender unconstitutionally sentenced to LWOP, and such an offender may petition for Miller resentencing via habeas corpus.

Prop. 57 applies retroactively to juvenile offenders whose cases are not yet final on appeal.

A reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that M used a butter knife in a way constituting felony assault with a deadly weapon.

Miranda advisements are only required when a person is subject to custodial interrogation.

A youth offender sentenced to 15 years to life and later found suitable for release under youth offender parole provisions is not required, prior to release, to serve a consecutive sentence for a crime committed in prison before age 23.

Termination of parental rights reversed where Mother was not allowed to testify to evidence of the sibling relationship exception to termination.

Prop. 57 does not apply retroactively.

Juvenile ct. erred in not providing alleged father with Judicial Council form JV-505 informing him of his right to seek presumed father status; error harmless.

Prop. 57 applies to criminal complaints filed in adult court against minors before the proposition took effect and where the matter is not yet brought to trial.

Prop. 57 requires remand to the juvenile ct. for a fitness hearing to determine whether an M's retrial on reversed counts, or resentencing, takes place in juvenile court or adult criminal court.

M's prison sentence for a non-homicide crime that exceeds his life expectancy is a functional LWOP sentence and is unconstitutional.

M's probation condition subjecting all his electronic devices to search was not unconstitutional where M used devices to commit offenses.

A juvenile court may convert an unfulfilled restitution order to a civil judgment when it terminates a minor’s probation and dismisses the wardship petition.

When a juvenile ct. renders a final determination of minor's rights in a wardship proceeding and enters an order, the order is appealable.

A juvenile offender sentenced to prison and who will be eligible for parole under PC §3051(b) must have the opportunity at sentencing to make a "record of mitigating evidence tied to youth" relevant to the offender's eventual parole hearing.

Shoplifting does not require larceny of openly displayed merchandise, only larceny of any property not exceeding a value of $950.

Where driver failed to produce identification upon officer's demand, officer may conduct a limited warrantless search for driver's I.D. in parts of vehicle where documentation can reasonably be expected to be found.

Trial ct. erred in sentencing minor (M) to LWOP for homicide absent use of Miller factors to determine M's crime reflected irreparable corruption resulting in permanent incorrigibility, rather than transient immaturity.

D’s age 55 parole eligibility date [after conviction of crimes committed when he was 14] was not a de facto LWOP sentence and the record did not suggest he would not have a meaningful life expectancy.

Following People v. Franklin, while D not entitled to resentencing, he is entitled to make a record of matters relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing under PC §3051 and PC §4801.

Trial ct. not authorized to order expungement of M's DNA sample when granting relief under PC §1170.18 to redesignate his admitted felony offense as a misdemeanor.

Trial ct. not required to expunge M's DNA sample after felony redesignated misdemeanor—Prop. 47’s treating redesignated offense as a misdemeanor “for all purposes” never applied to alter a crime’s original status.

Pliers M possessed during burglary come under PC §466's "other instrument or tool" as evidence showed M possessed them with the intent to use them to effectuate the burglary.

Condition requiring M to submit electronic devices to search upon request was valid under Lent as reasonably related to his future criminality, and not overbroad considering the level of supervision Minor requires.

Juv. court properly imposed probation conditions restricting M's use of and allowing the search of his electronics as reasonably related to his supervision and future criminality.

While PC 1170(d)(2) has a procedure by which some Ds serving LWOPs for crimes committed as juveniles may obtain resentencing, it does not provide such Ds with all the rights of Miller and Montgomery and is thus not a proper remedy for Miller error.

PC §3051 as applied to D’s 84-yr. sentence satisfied the constitutional mandates of Graham, Miller, and Caballero, affording him a parole hearing well within his life expectancy.

Condition prohibiting M's unsupervised presence on school grounds was unconstitutionally vague as it had no scienter requirement to prohibit M's unauthorized presence on property she knows is school property.

M, who violated PC §626.10, and was “presumptively ineligible” for informal supervision under PC §654.3, failed to prove his case was so "unusual" as to overcome the presumption.

As nothing in M’s offense or history connected his using electronic devices or social media and criminal activity, the electronics search condition would not serve a rehabilitative function and was invalid under Lent.

M's electronics search condition, though reasonable under Lent, was overbroad as drafted, requiring modification; M could not raise risk of unlawful eavesdropping on 3d parties as he had no standing as to them.

Though reasonable under Lent, condition requiring M to submit to warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords” was unconstitutionally overbroad.

Probation condition may require waiver of psychotherapist-patient privilege only insofar as necessary to enable communication between the supervising PO and sex offender management professional.

Sex offender's probation condition, requiring waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.

Miller announced new substantive rule of law and USSC intended it to apply retroactively to all who are similarly situated; LWOP for those under 18 at time of crimes violates prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.