ONCALL
...Children and the Law
......Dependency Petitions
63 Cards On This Topic:

Disability is not a bar to adoptability; continuing parent-child relationship did not outweigh permanency and stability of adoptive placement.

In terminating the parental rights of Indian parents, court did not err in not considering whether legal custody was likely to result in serious damage to the child, in addition to considering physical custody.

In terminating the parental rights of Indian parents, juvenile ct. record contained substantial evidence to support the ICWA detriment finding.

Juvenile ct. did not err when it determined the beneficial parent-child exception to the termination of parental rights did not apply.

It is not the role of the juvenile ct. to sua sponte come up with a solution to a child’s refusal to visit a parent under a visitation order.

W&IC §300(g) dependency jurisdiction exists if any of the four separate criteria for jurisdiction in the section exists.

In an Allen M. hearing, a juvenile ct. must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether dismissal of a dependency petition promotes a child's welfare.

ICWA did not apply where child's biological father initially indicated to the court that he may have Native American heritage, but later indicated he had new information that he did not have such heritage.

Juvenile ct. need not provide ICWA notice where presumed father was not C's biological or adoptive father.

Jurisdiction under W&IC §300(b) reversed as to Mother where she presented no substantial risk to C at the time of hearing; court could still order family services for her.

Minor could not be committed to the Department of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) where there was no specific information in the record regarding DJF programs that would benefit him.

Juvenile ct. did not err in finding that social services agency exercised due diligence in attempting to find relative placement for child.

Statutory preferences for relative and caretaker placement did not apply to C; court did not abuse discretion in placement decision.

Court erred in finding reasonable services were provided to Mother where agency completely failed to provide services, or did so only after several months delay; continuance of services ordered.

After a permanent plan of adoption is selected for a child, W&IC §366.3 does not mandate a particular consequence if adequate services are not provided.

Dependency jurisdiction reversed where, at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, child was not at substantial risk for serious harm in the future.

Even where actions of both parents triggered dependency jurisdiction for child, father's jurisdictional challenge justiciable as his status as an offending or nonoffending parent could have future consequences.

Juvenile ct.'s finding that BioDad was a Kelsey S. father reversed where court was collaterally estopped from making this determination by prior family court order.

Visitation between BioDad and C properly ordered where it benefitted C; no-contact order properly vitiated where BioDad showed changed circumstances.

FC §7612(c) allowing a child to have more than two parents only applies to biological mothers, adoptive parents and presumed parents.

Where social services agency did not interview extended family members, including Cs' paternal grandfather and great-grandmother, as part of ICWA heritage inquiry, remand was necessary.

A parent's failure to object in the juvenile ct. to ICWA compliance deficiencies, or failure to appeal from an earlier order, does not preclude the parent from raising the issue for the first time on appeal.

Where youngest child was not placed with his older siblings, Mother's reunification services with older siblings could not be limited to six months under WIC §361.5(a)(1)(C).

Juvenile ct. abused its discretion in determining continued placement of Cs with aunt was in their best interest when she intentionally limited Cs' food intake, caused their malnutrition and admitted no wrongdoing.

Where Indian tribe showed disinterest in child's placement, juvenile ct. had good cause to depart from ICWA.

Child protective agency is not relieved of ICWA inquiry duty where child's parent or other family member informs it of C's potential Indian ancestry but does not name a federally recognized tribe or fails to name a tribe.

Maternal uncle lacks standing to bring an Indian Child Welfare Act challenge regarding Cs where he is no longer Cs' Indian custodian.

Marriage does not affect a nonminor dependent's eligibility for extended foster care.

Family ct. has jurisdiction to renew a domestic violence restraining order initially granted by juvenile ct.

W&IC §300(b) jurisdiction unsupported by substantial evidence where harm to Cs may not be presumed by Mother's mental illness, and court incorrectly found that F did not do enough to protect Cs.

ICWA requires that placement of an Indian child must follow statutory preferences unless the Indian tribe involved establishes a different and objective order of placement by resolution.

Juvenile ct.'s finding of a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Cs upheld where Father could not stop drug use, use was increasing, he denied needing treatment, and Cs could potentially access drug.

Removal of Cs from Mother and F was proper where neither parent had begun a drug treatment program.

Once the juvenile ct. terminates jurisdiction, the family ct. assumes jurisdiction over restraining orders issued in the juvenile ct. and may renew them.

Fam. Code §6345 applies to restraining orders issued by the juvenile ct. as well as those issued by the family ct.

Failure to comply with Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act with regard to Arizona child results in reversal of order terminating parental rights.

Substantial evidence supported juvenile ct.'s bypass order regarding Mother and F due to their consistent drug abuse and other issues.

Mother did not show that reunification was in best interests of her child after she was bypassed for reunification services under W&IC §361.5(c).

Court's failure to appoint counsel for Mother during W&IC Code §388 hearing deprived her of due process and warranted reversal of court's orders.

Conditional removal order reversed as it disregards dependency scheme guarantees of procedural and substantive due process to both child and parent.

Dependency jurisdiction unsupported by substantial evidence where sole basis was Mother's mental condition and the question of future risk to child.

Dependency jurisdiction unsupported by substantial evidence where unloaded shotgun in household posed no substantial risk of serious harm to child.

Where DCFS did not meet its burden of proof on W&IC §300 allegations, and the subject Cs appeal, the question is not one of substantial evidence, but whether the evidence supports a finding for Cs as a matter of law.

Order terminating father's parental rights overturned where no unfitness or detriment finding was made against him during proceedings.

Abuse of discretion to craft disposition order requiring father to participate in alcohol abuse treatment and parenting services where he could not comply due to language barrier.

Jurisdictional order under W&IC §300(e) supported by substantial evidence.

Dispositional bypass order under W&IC §361.5(b)(5) supported by substantial evidence.

Mother's argument that spanking allegation did not support W&IC §300 jurisdiction was nonjusticiable.

Trial ct. erred in finding third parent under FC §7612(c) where it misapplied detriment to child and third parent had no existing relationship with child; remand required to determine presumed father.

If alleged father meets the requirements of FC §7611(d) for presumed father status at some point in his child's life, his subsequent failure to meet the requirements does not rebut the presumption.

A W&IC §387 supplemental petition sustained by the juvenile ct. does not confer dependency jurisdiction independent of a prior sustained W&IC §300 petition.

Mother whose child was subject to a probate guardianship had the right to participate in dependency proceedings; failure to allow her participation was prejudicial error.

Dependency jurisdiction may be asserted over child without a finding that parent is at fault or blameworthy in her failure or inability to supervise or protect child.

Mexican judicial authorities' failure to respond to juvenile ct.'s e-mails amounted to declination of jurisdiction over dependency matter; Mother's and Cs' CA connections and evidence of Cs' care in CA supported jurisdiction.

F's statement withdrawing his request for reunification services with Cs and his deportation due to assault did not support a finding that F was provided with reasonable reunification services.

Where juvenile ct. refuses to assert dependency jurisdiction over minor, and then minor reaches age of majority, minor's appeal of juvenile ct.'s refusal is moot.

Where F did nothing nor failed to do anything to cause substantial risk of serious physical harm to C, dependency jurisdiction was improper.

Parent does not have standing to raise relative placement issues on appeal where reunification services have been terminated.

Family lore of possible American Indian heritage does not trigger a social worker's duty to conduct further inquiry into a C's possible Indian ancestry under ICWA.

Dependency jurisdiction can be resumed for a nonminor under the Welf. & Inst. Code only when such jurisdiction was established by dispositional order before the nonminor's 18th birthday.

Limited reversal required for SSA to make active efforts to secure tribal membership for Cs as no evidence supported finding ICWA was not applicable and two tribes actually responded that Cs were eligible to enroll.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring P seeking SIJ status to join her allegedly abusive F to the pending UPA action where F’s identity and whereabouts in Honduras were known.

As mother’s physical disability made her unable to exercise care and control of C—she could not adequately supervise and protect him resulting in a substantial risk of harm to him—jurisd. properly invoked under 1st clause of W&IC §300(b)(1).