CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Hearsay
......Confrontation
.........Criminal-State Cases
............Crawford v. Wash. Standard
43 Cards On This Topic:

Unavailable declarant jailhouse statements to his attorney were not "testimonial" under Crawford, and were properly admitted into evidence at D's trial.

As hearsay stmts by D's wife and D’s cohort were not made to Os, nor under circumstances suggesting primary purpose of creating evidence for the DA, they were not testimonial, and their admission did not violate D's confrontation rights.

Because O did not recount what unavailable witness W had told him, but merely testified he had spoken to her, there was no admission of an out-of-court hearsay statement within the meaning of Crawford.

Admission of V's declaration in support of TRO against D was harmless error where statements corroborated live testimony, events were separate from charged incident and evidence of murder was overwhelming.

Because W statement to police, taken long after shootings, was testimonial and D had no opportunity to cross-examine deceased W, admitting videotape over his objection violated his federal constitutional right to confront witnesses.

Any error in admitting V's statement to police identifying D as his attacker was harmless where V's statements not testimonial under Crawford and Davis.

As co-D's redacted statement contained no evidence against D, it could not implicate the confrontation clause and was properly admitted.

Though C's hearsay statements to O at police station and in ER were clearly testimonial under Crawford, erroneous admission harmless beyond reasonable doubt.

C's hearsay statement to ER doctor at hospital nontestimonial under Crawford and properly admitted at trial.

Even assuming V’s statements to Officer were made in response to interrogation and admission violated D’s U.S. Const. Amend. VI rights, error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Assuming admission of W's statements to O violated 6th Amend. under Crawford, any error in admitting statements harmless—important factual issue at trial was identity, not manner in which Vs were killed.

Os' testimony was not hearsay, nor did it violate D's rights under confrontation clause where it was not admitted for its truth but to show what accomplices said to Os before recording of jailhouse tape.

Common law pedigree of the hearsay exception for dying declarations poses no conflict with Sixth Amendment.

As co-perpetrator's statements during taped reenactment were admitted as adoptive admissions, D's confrontation right not implicated.

When declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.

Pen. Code 969b packet of D's prior convictions not testimonial and properly admitted and did not violate his 6th Amend. confrontation rights.

Using certified copies of Ds' prison packets to prove prior convictions did not violate confrontation clause where packet documents were prepared for nontestimonial purposes and were admissible hearsay.

Truthful stmts D2 made to Detective before arrest, designed to support her false stmts and advance the conspiracy, were admissible under the Confrontation Clause; stmts to 911 and O not testimonial under Crawford.

V's brief informal statement, made on night of shooting to a firefighter in an ambulance when V was close to death and shooter was still at large, was nontestimonial and its admission did not violate Crawford.

Rape V's stmts to nurse were testimonial and inadmissible where nurse acted as police agent, main purpose of exam. was to prove past fact for possible crim. trial use, and stmts not made to deal with current medical situation.

D's confrontation rights not violated by admission of testimony of nurse re sexual assault exam. performed by nontestifying nurse as report not testimonial under Geier; if narrative portion testimonial, no prejudicial error.

Even if some Crawford-violative statements improperly admitted in DV case, D suffered no prejudice where properly admitted hearsay statements overwhelmingly proved he assaulted V.

Even if Crawford applied to admin. proceedings, no violation of right to confront and cross-examine where W's statements in call to Sheriff's Station were nontestimonial; Crawford does not apply to probation revocation proceedings.

Taulton court was correct in holding that CLETS rap sheets are not testimonial hearsay and their admission did not violate D's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him under Crawford.

6th Amend. did not apply to Ds' incriminating jailhouse conversation where they were friends who felt at liberty to speak freely and no DA abuse or govt coercion prompted their "damning words."

Domestic violence V's account to O at station of having been assaulted and threatened by D was non-testimonial w/in meaning of Davis, and its admission did not violate confrontation clause.

As O interrupted an ongoing emergency and obtained information from V to assess situation, V's statement to him was not testimonial and properly admitted against D under Crawford.

Abuse of discretion to exclude videotaped interviews with elder abuse V as purely testimonial and in failing to consider that nonhearsay statements are not subject to confrontation clause.

Confrontation clause does not preclude admission of portion of videotape depicting the condition of elder abuse V's residence as it is demonstrative evidence and not testimonial.

Nontestifying W's answers to O's questions, admitted at trial, were to determine the exact nature of the emergency and were nontestimonial statements under Davis.

Admitting D2's girlfriend's testimony under spontaneous statement exception did not violate D1's confrontation rights as they were not testimonial per Crawford and bore indicia of reliability under Roberts.

Crawford not watershed decision and does not apply retroactively to habeas petitions that collaterally challenge convictions already final on direct appeal; watershed rule implicates fundamental fairness and accuracy of proceeding.

Records of prior convictions are not "testimonial" and therefore not subject to Crawford v. Washington's confrontation requirement.

V's out-of-court spontaneous statements, made to a civilian unconnected to law enforcement under circs in which V could not reasonably anticipate their use in court, were not testimonial under Crawford.

Any Crawford error from admitting police dispatch tape harmless error; tape did not offend Crawford because of its content, not because it might qualify as a "business record."

Court need not decide if murdered W's prior statements about D's domestic violence were testimonial where harmless error to admit them in light of overwhelming evidence of D's guilt and cumulative nature of evidence.

Admission of proof of service of notice of domestic violence order as evidence of service was not testimonial and did not violate D's right to confront witnesses under Crawford v. Washington.

Same qualities that led to caller's statements' reliability, their performance nature and unintentional nature, indicated they were not testimonial, and no confrontation clause violation under Crawford.

Where V present, testified, and cross-examined, use of prior out-of-court stmts did not violate Confrontation Clause; testimony gave jury opportunity to assess her demeanor as she tried to deny or explain away prior stmts.

Trial court properly admitted O's hearsay testimony of D's wife where D had opportunity to cross-examine her at prelim.; Crawford v. Wash. standard applied.

Admitting laboratory report at probation revocation hearing did not violate D's constitutional rights; Crawford v. Wash. and 6th Amend. concerns inapplicable at such hearings.

Statment not testimonial w/in meaning of Crawford where D did not reasonably anticipate it would be used at trial.

Cases discussing Crawford v. Wash. standard in state criminal cases.