CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Opinion & Scientific Evidence
......Forensic Issues
.........Sanity & Mental Processes
............Criminal Cases: Limitations on Opin.
 27 Cards On This Topic:
  • Defense experts may not testify re D's diminished capacity at time offense committed.
  • Limits on use of evidence of mental condition in criminal action.
  • Expert may not testify re whether accused had requisite mental state to commit charged offense.
  • No opinions permitted re whether D possessed mental state constituting element of offense. (Fed. Rules Evid.)
  • Trial ct. properly limited D's forensic expert’s testimony regarding crime scene reconstruction, and prohibited him from giving unsupported, speculative testimony about D’s mental state during the crimes.
  • Because there was not substantial evidence of incompetency, trial court did not err in failing to hold proceedings to determine D's competency during the guilt phase.
  • Psychiatrist's testimony re D's mental disorders added nothing much to information already before court, and court did not err in failing to declare a doubt and initiate proceedings under PC §1368 during penalty retrial.
  • Even assuming E's testimony on cross-exam. [that although D was psychotic and paranoid at time of offenses, no evidence supporting a psychiatric defense existed] violated PC 29, any error would be harmless.
  • Trial court did not abuse its discretion under PC 1368 in denying defense counsel’s motion for psychiatric evaluation of D where no evidence of incompetence and court did not express doubt about his competence.
  • No error in finding no substantial evidence of D’s incompetence despite bizarre behavior and purported suicide attempt where D’s expert less than credible and he disregarded contrary evidence and other scenarios.
  • Defendant suffering effects of jailhouse stabbing did not come forward with substantial evidence of his incompetence to stand trial to overcome testimony of his doctor that he was competent.
  • Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding cult expert testimony on D's inability to form mental state for 1st degree murder.
  • Trial court did not err in refusing to let psychologist testify on "unconscious transference" in witness I.D. where it was of tenuous relevance, highly speculative and tended to confuse jury.
  • DA can introduce evidence of D's mental illness in case-in-chief as aggravating evidence if it relates to circumstances of the crime (PC 190 (a)), even if inadmissible under (d) and (k).
  • No abuse of discretion in excluding E's testimony on brain physiology, neurotransmitters, and "spillover rage" where abstract testimony admitted re spillover rage and D's mental state; excluded testimony prohibited by PC 28 and 29.
  • D properly found competent to stand trial where defense evidence of incompetence was not compelling and DA's witnesses, and D himself, contradicted much of defense testimony.
  • Pen. Code §§28 & 29 don't preclude the defense of absence of mental state that is element of charged offense—they do preclude expert opinion that element was not present.
  • DA's questions seeking E's inadmissible opinion re D's capacity to form intent required for crimes, and DA's seeking to "open door" on issue, were improper but not denial of fair trial right.
  • Because D's physician witness worked at the jail, D failed to show the doctor could provide relevant testimony as to D's medical condition at the hospital to which she was taken after the murder.
  • As trial ct. adequately instructed on the elements of the charged crimes, including malice aforethought, no possible likelihood the jury failed to properly apply CALJIC No. 3.32 regarding D's mental state.
  • New competency trial req'd where D's trial counsel erred in not objecting to testimony of DA's experts at sanity trial—judicially declared rule of immunity applies to D's statements to competency Es and fruits of competency exam.
  • Court's failure to order competency hearing, where substantial evidence of incompetence, deprived mentally retarded D of fair trial; substantial incompetence evidence need not be established by an expert.
  • BWS evidence not admissible under Evid. Code §805 on ultimate issue of actual fear of imminent death or serious bodily injury at time offense committed.
  • No improper restriction on expert testimony re D's mental condition.
  • Pen. Code §29 prohibits expert from offering opinion on ultimate question of D's mental state at time of act, regardless of terms used.
  • Pen. Code §29 supports exclusion of expert testimony re D's capacity to form specific intent necessary for conviction of 1st degree murder.
  • Limitations of Pen. Code §29 prevail over general rules concerning admissibility of expert opinion.


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