CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Presumptions & Burden of Proof
......Burden of Proof
.........Criminal Matters
............Jury Instructions
 33 Cards On This Topic:
  • Circumstantial evidence instructions did not create an improper mandatory presumption requiring jury to draw an incriminating inference if it was only reasonable. CALJIC No. 2.51 did not suggest D could be convicted on evidence of motive alone.
  • Instructing jury it could infer D's guilt of murder, based on his possessing recently stolen property with other slight corroboration of guilt, was error, though harmless.
  • Trial court erred under Constitution and state law by failing to instruct D could not be convicted unless the DA proved elements of criminal street gang crime beyond a reasonable doubt; error harmless under Chapman.
  • No reasonable likelihood the jury could have understood the instructions to relieve the DA of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of D as perpetrator.
  • CALJIC 2.15 may be inappropriate for non-theft-related crimes, and instructing that possession of stolen property may create an inference D is guilty of murder is error.
  • D's fleeing scene of murders and not being found for 4 yrs. sufficient to warrant flight instruction; such instruction does not create an unconstit'l permissive inference or lessen DA's burden of proof.
  • Because jury could reasonably infer from evidence that D attempted to conceal evidence by removing identifying body parts from V1's corpse before disposing of it, CALJIC No. 2.06 was properly given.
  • Harmless error not to define reasonable doubt at penalty phase, where jury would likely have assumed the reasonable doubt referred to at the penalty phase had the same meaning as the term had when defined during guilt phase.
  • Because neither running away nor reaching "faraway haven" is necessary to establish flight, court properly gave flight instruction where D caught at V's house trying to get out.
  • CALJIC 2.02 instruction does not reduce DA's burden of proof nor affect fundamental constitutional rights.
  • Refusing to limit CALJIC 2.15 to theft and omit robbery and burglary did not lessen DA's burden of proof guilt beyond reasonable doubt and did not favor DA's theory of case.
  • CALJIC No. 8.87 does not improperly remove from jury's consideration the question whether D's conduct amounts to criminal act.
  • Jury instructions re DA's burden of proof did not undermine the reasonable doubt requirement nor violate D's constitutional rights.
  • D's contention that jury instructions unconstitutional as they misled jurors regarding reasonable doubt standard and impermissibly lightened DA's burden of proof all rejected in previous SC cases.
  • DA's closing argument did not mislead jury as to the burden and standard of proof.
  • As jury was also instructed with meaning of reasonable doubt and required to follow court's instructions (CALJIC 2.90 and 1.00), giving CALJIC 2.02 was not misleading and did not operate as a mandatory conclusive presumption.
  • No error in giving reasonable doubt and burden of proof jury instructions.
  • There was sufficient evidence to support jury finding D attempted to use force or violence in committing burglary for theft, and jury was properly instructed under PC 190.3, factor (b).
  • CALCRIM No. 220 does not fail to instruct that each element of the charged offenses require proof beyond a reasonable doubt—time for appellate attorneys "to take this frivolous contention off their menus."
  • Instruction re motive did not conflict with those for criminal street gang participation and sentence enhancement/special circumstance provisions re criminal street gangs, nor lessen DA's burden of proof.
  • Neither court's limitation on D's CALCRIM No. 220 argument, nor DA's argument, misled jury as to "permanen[cy]" requirement re "an abiding conviction"; no reasonable likelihood jury misled as to DA's burden of proof.
  • Because evidence established the young woman D was accused of encouraging to become a prostitute was already a prostitute, court erred in instructing jury incorrectly and pandering conviction reversed.
  • Trial court correctly refused D's proposed modification of CALCRIM 226 where instruction, together with counsel's argument, fully and fairly informed jury as to D's theory of the case.
  • No error in instructing jury with CALCRIM No. 220; instruction does not misstate proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard by not referring to the conviction of proof being deeply "felt."
  • Permanent disfiguring injury requirement is the same for simple and aggravated mayhem, and trial court did not err in instructing the jury that a "disfiguring injury may be permanent even if it can be repaired by medical procedures."
  • CALCRIM No. 226 (Witnesses) does not impermissibly lighten DA's burden of proof.
  • Revised CALCRIM 220 instructions, taken as a whole, adequately informed jury that DA required to prove each element of charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • CALCRIM instructions were properly given and there was no error such as to affect D's substantial rights.
  • Though issue waived, CALCRIM 220 does not lower reasonable doubt standard by not defining abiding conviction nor does CALCRIM 226 invite jurors to consider matters outside record by telling them to use common sense and experience.
  • CALCRIM 220 merely instructs jury it must consider only the evidence presented at trial in determining whether DA met burden of proof.
  • As jury not instructed D could not be found guilty unless all elements of charged offenses were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, his convictions reversed.
  • Omission of CALJIC No. 2.90 was not federal constit’l error where instructions given adequately apprised jury of reasonable doubt std and due process requirement that guilt be adjudged solely on evidence presented.
  • CALJIC No. 12.24.1 does not suggest to jury that criminal D using compassionate use defense has burden to prove his innocence; it accurately states his obligation to raise reasonable doubt that his possession of marijuana was unlawful.


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